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Book Reviews
THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION.

By C.J. Mann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.

Pp. xiv, 567.
The theme of this exhaustive and scholarly investigation' is perfectly expressed in the title, The Function of JudicialDecision in
European Economic Integration, which at once reveals that although this is a book about law, it is of interest not only to lawyers
but also to economists and to political scientists since the founders
of the European Communities sought to use economic integration
to bring about political integration. For the uninitiated in these
matters-if any such remain-it might have been convenient to
have some subtitle for the book, such as "A Study of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities," for it is that Court which
is its concern. But the initiated will have immediately deduced as
much from the phrase "economic integration" in the title, because
integration is the hallmark of the European Communities,
whereas, other international European economic collaboration
(whether or not based on treaty arrangements, such as the European Free Trade Organization) has not gone, and does not go,
beyond cooperation. The theme is highly important, and it should
be said at once that the 500 or so pages of the text will repay careful
reading. The author is to be congratulated and thanked for the
very great amount of work he has clearly put into his task and the
enlightening nature of the result he has produced.
Upon the formation of the three European Communities, it was
as if the founding Treaties, having juxtaposed the six member
States with the new Institutions (the Council of Ministers, the
Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice) that they
brought into being as well as the natural or legal persons in the
member States, and having laid down the framework of the rights
and duties of each of these categories in respect of each other, bade
1. This work was for part fulfillment of the Doctor Juris degree of the Friedrich Wilhelm University at Bonn, Germany, which the author was awarded in
1967. Parts of the manuscript were subsequently expanded and revised to take
account of developments to mid-1970.
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them all proceed from that point, independently of the national
legal orders of each of the member States, and of the rights and
duties of natural or legal persons therein, so as to coalesce into a
new, well-defined and clearly articulated form of human organization or society, to be called from the outset a Community-since,
in law, that is what the three 'European Communities were from
the entry into force of the Treaties.
It is clear that in such a situation the jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice, which was established to ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed, needed to
be varied. It became in fact a widespread habit in CommunityEurope to refer to that jurisdiction, at least for descriptive purposes, as constitutional (when, in particular, the rights and duties
of the Community Institutions in respect of each other and of the
member States were concerned), as international(when the relationships of member States inter se in respect of Community matters were concerned), as administrative(when the exercise of executive powers by the Community Institutions was under challenge
before the Court, on the basis of the provisions of administrative
law, in the European continental sense, laid down in the treaties
themselves), as domestic (when the Court heard disputes between
employees of a Community Institution and that Institution), and
so on. These descriptions were no doubt useful, especially in the
early days, but they were never able to fulfil the role of precise
definitions.
The author's approach is to treat the Court essentially as a constitutional court, and his intention is revealed or at least adumbrated as early as Chapter IV, well before he leaves generalization
to embark, in Part Three, on his methodical analysis of the jurisprudence or case law of the court. He writes:
This is not to say, as previous Chapters have demonstrated, that
comparisons of the Community Court with the International Court
of Justice are useless. Their value is greatly reduced, however, because the international law system at present lacks the disciplined
constitutional framework of the Communities as well as an analogous distribution of powers within the context of judicial review.
The constitutional courts of the United States and Germany, on the
other hand, meet these requirements, and more. The division of
powers which they supervise embraces both the horizontal one of
federal-state relationships as well as the vertical one among the
various branches of government. Nevertheless, the powers of each
Summer, 1974
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are so circumscribed that their authority depends to a great extent
on the willing cooperation of other governmental institutions. Thus,
despite certain important organizational and jurisdictional differences, the adjudication of the United States Supreme Court and the
German Federal Constitutional Court will fairly reflect, though not
at all perfectly, the tensions at work in the European Communities.2
One would not dispute this statement. The approach to the au-

thor's theme which it indicates has, moreover, the incidental advantage of allowing him to view things in part from his own homeground, besides being sufficiently broad to cover most facets of the
Court's jurisdiction and to examine the effect of the exercise of that
jurisdiction in promoting a coalescence (as this reviewer has suggested above) into a clearly articulated Community and in promoting, as a resultant thereof, economic integration. It may be that
this approach leads to an omission, for example, in examining
whether there has developed a special Community form of administrative law, itself of importance in economic integration; but set
against the wide coverage that the approach undoubtedly provides, such an omission can only be of marginal consequence. So
also is the possibility that the author's treatment of the Court's
attitude towards interpretation of the treaties in accordance with
the general principles of member State constitutions 3 might have
revealed differing nuances of understanding, were he not thinking
of the Court essentially as a constitutional one.
Writing some six years before the present author, a comparably
gifted researcher, Jean-Pierre Colin, examined whether the great
influence of the Court of Justice in the process of coalescence and
economic integration in the Communities did not in fact make it
justifiable to speak of "Le gouvernement des juges dans les Communaut6s Europ6enees"-the title he gave his published work.
The fundamental question that the present author examines runs
so closely to that posed by Mr. Colin, though not identical therewith, that there is even some temptation to view the two in double
harness. For example, the author writes: "What is the nature and
source of judicial power at the level of constitutional adjudication?
Some would flatly deny that such power exists-that the judiciary
2.

C. MANN, THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

142 (1972).
3. Id. at 356-57.
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possesses any real power in government." 4
The present author, while still treating in general terms "The
Theoretical Foundations of Judicial Decision," ' gives clear indications of what he is later to show as the essential feature of the
Court's jurisprudence (which he examines in Part Three). Thus, at
page 118 he writes: "Interpretation means not merely understanding the text as it is, but developing it (Fortbildung), completing it
and, if necessary, even correcting it. 'Juristische Interpretation,'
declares Esser in words which this whole study echoes, 'ist nicht
Nachdenken des Vorgedachten, sondern Zu-Ende-Denken eines
Gedachten-ja . . .Zu-Ende-Denken eines weltueberall Gedachten.' " By page 169 the author is examining the "responsible limits
of creative judicial decision" in terms of the realities of a judiciary's institutional setting. These realities in turn derive "to a large
extent" from "the insight and experience gained from resultoriented jurisprudence."7 Concluding Part Two with a backward
glance over the road travelled, the author writes: "This analysis of
the theoretical foundations of judicial decision has focused on the
broad scope for judicial creativity in the law." 8 Only a few pages
later, at the very outset of Part Three ("The Jurisprudence of the
Court," which is really the substantive part of the entire work) the
author can already declare:
As a matter of method, therefore, the Court has adopted essentially
a teleological approach to Treaty interpretation. It decides in terms
of known Treaty objectives, but these in turn unfold in light of the
"new objects or vistas" revealed through the operation of the Treaties. This approach accords with the evolutionary quality of Community law, based not as the United Nations on "orders of coordination" but rather on "orders of integration." 9
There can surely be no doubt of the accuracy of this statement.
It does not, however, represent a fresh discovery. The freshness and
4.
5.
6.
prose

Id.at 169.
Id. at 91-226 (Part Two).
Id. at 118 (footnotes omitted) (reviewer's italics). "In translation Esser's
reads: 'Judicial interpretation is not reflecting on a prior idea, but thinking

through an idea to its completion ... indeed ... thinking through a worldwide

idea.'" Id. at 118 n.131.
7. Id. at 169 (reviewer's italics).
8. Id.at 223.
9. Id.at 233.
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originality of the author's work, as well as its value, which is very
great, lies in his detailed analysis of the way in which the court has
performed its tasks. These he defines "as the continuing search for
purpose, authority and practicability in an imperfect and everdeveloping positive law."'" It is under the three headings of the
search for Purpose, Authority and Practicability, that the work of
the Court is analyzed in detail in Part Three. Part One, dealing in
two chapters with "The Legal Character of the Communities" and
"The Jurisdiction of the Court," and Part Two, a theoretical study
in two chapters of "The Concept of Law in Judicial Decision" and
"The Institutional Foundations of Judicial Decision," are by their
nature only an introduction to Part Three. In Part Three the author claims that "[niot all but certainly the most important of the
350 odd judgments of the Court, covering seventeen years from
1953 through mid-1970, are examined .
... ,1 This work of the
Court, moreover, is "tested not only against the substantive product of lines of decisions, but also in terms of the real limits to
judicial power," which result from the "institutional framework"
in which the Court is placed.'2
In Part Three the facts of each particular case and the economic
context and effect of the Court's judgment therein are set out in a
succinct and illuminating manner which gives much intellectual
pleasure to the reader. It may owe much to the author's previous
training in economics. But the thought-provoking, or instructive,
conclusions that the author draws from the examination of the
cases gives his work its special value. For the purposes of a review
such as this a few examples of such conclusions must suffice. Thus,
concluding a review of the coal-pricing disputes and the problem
of market organization of the Ruhr enterprises, the author comments:
By virtue of changing economic circumstances in light of the shifting
requirements of Treaty goals, therefore, the concept of "normal
competition" may undergo a transformation. In thus extending the
scope of the [coal and steel] market to substitute and imported
products, the Court has adopted the "dynamic" of [its] AdvocateGeneral Roemer . . . . Community law has been adapted to the
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 225.
12. Id.
Vol. 7-No. 3
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changing requirements of economic integration. The standard of
market structure and with it the concept of "normal competition"
have been reformulated and, in addition, complemented by a more
extensive control over market behavior. There has occurred a conscious shift of emphasis from preventive to subsequent means of
market control. This offers an instructive example of legal development through judicial decision.' 3
Yet, as another example, still in respect of the search for purpose,
the author suggests that "the Court has been particularly cautious
in substituting its views of goal balancing for those of the High
Authority [of the Coal and Steel Community] and EEC Commission."" The Court, moreover, "possesses the ways and means for
maintaining discussion before laying an issue to rest"15-it can so
maneuver as to induce a greater Community consensus on the
issue, or at least a more thorough examination of it by different
interests in the Community, before finally pronouncing.
As the author enters upon the second chapter of Part Three,

"The Search for Authority," it follows naturally that the author
should comment: "The Court, therefore, is bound to a loyal interpretation of the Treaties, but this interpretation, to be effective,
must respect the outer limits of Community consensus.""0 Twentyfour pages later he suggests: "The conscious formation of legal
sources may well be the most lasting contribution of the Court to
the development of authority in Community Law, 11 7 and in that
general connection, he remarks:
The Court's conception of Community law. . . constitutes a radical
separation of Community and Member State legal orders. It tends
to stress the mutual independence rather than interdependence of
both. While this has the virtue of screening the former against the
paralyzing tendencies of divergent national practice, it also bears
the mark of that dualist position which has so enfeebled the integrative effects of international law. Despite this rigorous formulation
• . . the Court has been neither so restrained in asserting Community law nor unwilling to receive the principles and practices of
the Member State legal orders. It is, therefore, well on its way to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 344.
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making the Treaty legal systems a self-constituting factor in the
development of Community law. Herein lies their persuasive
value."'
This last statement, though a provoking one like the other examples quoted, might perhaps have shown less concern for the enfeebling "dualist position" had the author been researching and writing some few years later. For it appears to the present reviewer that
there has come about a better and wider understanding of the
circumstances in which that dualism is submerged under the prevalence of Community law over the law of Member States, to the
extent necessary for Community law to be enforced-provided the
part of Community law concerned is, as the phrase now goes, "directly applicable" in the Member States. For, in the earlier years
of the Communities, such elements of Community law had been
thought of in terms of the traditional notion that some legal provisions may be "self-executing." Largely through the case law of the
Court there has now been substituted the much more precise concept of the law "directly applicable," and the movement has been
strengthened by the steady number of references to the Court from
national courts, under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, for a preliminary ruling as to whether this or that element of Community law
is, or is not, directly applicable in Member States. The author
appears not to have been entirely abreast of this movement, for his
use of the now outmoded expression "self-executing" occurs for
example at page 392 (in respect of EEC Treaty Article 95(1)) and
at page 402 (in respect of article 12). Later, at pages 408 and 40911
he does not, with his usual prescience, take up the hint contained
in the Court's statement (regarding EEC Treaty Article 37) that
it" 'is binding on the States and concerns their nationals directly;
these [nationals] can derive rights from it which are to be respected by the national courts.' ",20 This is perhaps a little disappointing to the reader in view of the treatment very early in the
book of the question of "open conflict between Community and
subsequent national legislation" at pages 35 and 36, in which passage the expression "directly applicable" is used in what is now its
18. Id.at 349.
19. The author considers the treatment by the Court of the E.N.E.L. case,
concerned with the nationalization of electricity by Italy.
20. Id. at 409.
Vol. 7-No. 3
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generally accepted connotation. While discussing the earlier Bosch
case of 1962, the author comments: "In a clear and reasoned judgment, the Court affirms the 'self-executing' character of Article
85. ' 21 The Court itself used the expression, of course, but that was
when the story of the development of this particular aspect of
judicial and Community legal thinking began-and in that judgment the Court, suspending the application of the article until the
entry into force of Regulation 17, did not need to give expression
to a concept such as "direct applicability." The author, in his final
conclusions to the book, has not moved ahead: "The authorized
acts as well as the self-executing provisions of the Treaties directly
'22
bind Member State nationals and their enterprises.
Elsewhere his prescience is revealed. He touches on human
rights as guaranteed in the individual Member States, and still
occupied with "search for authority," referring to the European
Convention on Human Rights, he comments in words that are
almost prophetic of what the Court has since done: "While this
Convention does not bind the Communities as such, it constitutes
that broad core of constitutional rights recognized in all the Member States. There is every reason, therefore, to affirm the interpretation of Community law in conformity with the general principles
of law embodied in the Member State constitutions." '
The "search for practicability" by the Court is treated from two
standpoints, "the well-shaped rule" and "of rule and discretion."
In respect of the former, discussion is "focused on two judicial
techniques of rule formation, the legal fiction and the per se rule. 24
(It is challenging, incidentally, to be informed that "the utility of
legal fictions lies in the conscious use of false statements, 2 1 while
for a British reader, the investigation by comparison with the essentially American per se rule should be revealing.) The problem
in finding "the well-shaped rule" is of course that "[t]he Treaties,
as may be expected, rarely offer concrete rules of law ready for
unambiguous case application, [and that in] '[t]he normation of
economic facts . . . [i]t is impossible to avoid the use of concepts
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 452.
at 508.
at 358 (footnotes deleted).
at 473.
at 435.
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which require value judgments and can be grasped only through
the knowledge and evaluation of economic relationships.' ",28 "Unfortunately, the Court too readily has mistaken conceptualistic
simplicity for rule practicability, 2 the author comments, drawing
attention to "the confusing and highly abstract rationale underlying the construction of EEC Article 85(1) . . . .Predictability in
this important area of Community law [competition law] has
are forced to second-guess
greatly suffered and interested parties
'28
the Court and the path of the law.
If a "high standard of clear and intelligible rules wchich carry
their reasoning on their face in order to guide as they control...
is the basis for certainty and predictability in the law . . .the
search for practicability also has its institutional aspects. Not
is a proper subject for the
every legal problem, to put it bluntly,
'29
judicial rule shaping function.
Rule and Discretion [have found a degree of balance in that] the
legislative and executive organs of the Communities have benefited
most often from the exercise of restraint in judicial rule-making.
And this perhaps for no better reason than that their acts are the
grist of Community adjudication. That is to say, in part, when questions have arisen as to the appropriateness or expediency of Community measures or as to the assessment or prediction of economic
facts and circumstances, the Court has been willing to recognize a
certain sphere of discretion for the Community organ concerned.2
This discretion is considered with regard to "Timing and Enforcement of the Treaties," "Individualization in the Motivation Requirement," and "Retroactivity and Certainty in Executive Decisions."
Not all the author's conclusions may necessarily be agreed with,
but enough has been said to indicate that anyone with a continuing
interest in the future case law of the European Court might with
advantage, in assessing it, adopt the author's criteria of purpose,
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. (per Advocate-General Roemer).
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 474.
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authority and practicability, so interestingly applied in Part
Three. In Part Two, "The Theoretical Foundations of Judicial
Decision," he gives the impression of being less sure of himself and
the reading is more heavy-going-though that Part is certainly not
without considerable value.
Edward H. Wall*

M.A., 1935, Cambridge University; Barrister-at-Law (Lincoln's Inn), 1941;
part-time Judge of the Supreme Restitution Court of Western Germany, 1968.
*
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INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AT THE CROSSROADS: NATIONAL SuP-

By David W. Wainhouse with
the assistance of Frederick P. Bohannon, James E. Knott, Anne
P. Simons. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
Pp. 634. $22.50.
As the primary function of the United Nations has shifted from
the implementation of collective enforcement, as originally envisaged under Chapter 7 of the Charter, to an emphasis on the conciliPORT-EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS.

ation of differences in a multipolar heterosymmetrical environment, the strengthening of the peacekeeping machinery constitutes the sine qua non for a stable international order. For this

reason, any serious study on what Dag Hammarskjold once called
"preventive diplomacy" inevitably commands attention among
scholars and representatives in the council of nations. This volume
by Mr. Wainhouse is one such study and a most outstanding work
among the recent publications on the subject.
As a sequel to an earlier study by the same author, entitled
InternationalPeace Observation, this work by David W. Wainhouse, a former ranking official of the State Department, focuses
attention mainly on the question of national support and participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities. Combining detailed case studies with a trenchant analysis of future trends, this
book covers the gamut of the complex issues of national participation in international contingents including, inter alia, political,.
financial, manpower and logistic assistance as well as organizational arrrangements on the national, international and local levels. Relevant documents selected from the Official Records of the
Security Council and the General Assembly and extracts from
"status of forces" agreements are appended to each chapter.
Charts denoting the organizational patterns of the various operations and massive statistical tables on the composition of the contingents and financial contributions and reimbursements abound
in the compendium. This notable work will stand as an indispensable guide and a standard reference for international peacekeeping
for many years to come.
In the typology on peacekeeping, Mr. Wainhouse uses the generic term to cover both peacekeeping forces and peace observation
missions.' A more analytical framework, however, has been sug1. D. WAINHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AT THE CROSSROADS: NATIONAL
SUPPORT-EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 1 (1973).
Vol. 7-No. 3
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gested by Alan James, who in his The Politics of Peacekeeping
differentiates between three categories of operations: (1) "patchup activities" designed to bring about an agreement between the
disputants and to assist in the execution of a settlement; (2) a
"prophylactic" function for preventing a situation of conflict from
deteriorating; and (3) a form of "proselytism" in which the Organization acts as an instrument either for change in pursuance of an
internationally accepted norm or for the rectification of anomalies
arising from a post-colonial situation. For example, truce supervisions in Palestine and in the Sinai illustrate the first category, the
operations in Lebanon and Cyprus the second, and Op6ration des
Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) the third.
These major undertakings and other comparatively minor ones
are reviewed by Mr. Wainhouse in eight long chapters covering
over 300 pages in a most comprehensive and precise manner. The
account on the Congo is of particular interest inasmuch as it chronicles, as does nothing else, the prodigious support and wholehearted collaboration given by the Western powers including,
above all, the provision of airlift and sealift facilities, communications equipment and supplies, foodstuffs and many other items.
Mr. Wainhouse comments with reason that "[i]n the case of the
Congo it is possible to be categorical. No national air service, military or civilian, nor any feasible combination of such services,
other than the United States, could have approached the initial
airlift capability provided by the U.S. Air Force for ONUC in JulyAugust 1960. ' '2 The lesson to be drawn is that superpower assistance must remain an essential factor contributing to the effectiveness and success of any large-scale international action in the
future.
Regional peacekeeping activities are dealt with in three chapters
stressing, in particular, the role and accomplishments of the Arab
League, the Organization of American States and the Organization
of African Unity. Regarding the first, Mr. Wainhouse states that
its 1961 operation in Kuwait constituted "a very significant development in the Arab League system [although] it did not become
the pattern for the future."' 3 The OAS operation during the Dominican Crisis of 1965 is considered "a 'success' [as] [it was an
2. Id. at 333.
3. Id. at 427.
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essential factor in providing the degree of stability required for

negotiating a settlement.

.

.

. "4

A contrary view, it may be noted,

was expressed by Lincoln P. Bloomfield who wrote in 1966 that
"the O.A.S. operates in the shadow of one dominant country. The
majority of the Latin American states appear to have resisted recent American efforts to make an institution out of the figleaf the
'5
O.A.S. spread over American troops in the Dominican Republic."
The OAU has never launched a peacekeeping force, although its
Defense Commission did recommend the allocation by its members of military units to be placed when needed at the 'disposal of
the Organization. 6 In the final analysis, regional agencies, while
capable of performing a useful supporting role, could hardly be
expected to be an adequate substitute for a universal security
organization.
Apropos of the prospect of international peacekeeping as a permanent institution, Mr. Wainhouse has not given the readers,
despite the provocative title of the book, much in-depth analysis
of the position of the Soviet Union, the principal challenger of the
system. Brief references, however, are made to the nonparticipation of the Soviet bloc in the UN operations with the sole
exception of the initial Commission for investigating the Greek
frontier incidents; 7 the controversy over the financing of UNEF
and ONUC;8 Soviet objections expressed in the Security Council
against the establishment of OAS contingents during the Dominican Crises;9 and the lukewarm support given by the Soviet Union
to the operation for Cyprus. 10
If the adamant stand of the Soviet authorities constitutes a lasting obstacle to the development of peacekeeping in the future,
reference could perhaps be made to the revealing exchange between Arthur Dean and V. A. Zorin in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1961. In that forum, when Mr. Dean
suggested that on the basis of the experience of the UN during the
past sixteen years there existed a valuable opportunity to apply the
4. Id.at 593.
5. Bloomfield, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, 44
(1966).
6. WAINHOUSE, supra note 1, at 601.
7. Id.at 11.
8. Id.at 16, 17.
9. Id.at 486.
10. Id.at 349-50.
Vol. 7-No. 3

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

671, 681

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

lessons of the past and to take important steps to strengthen the
ability of the UN to keep the peace, "Mr. Zorin promptly responded: 'In all these cases the armed forces set up were not established in accordance with the United Nations Charter but in
violation of it.' ""' Greater attention might also be given to the
multitude of documents submitted by the Soviet Government to
the Committee of 33 of Peacekeeping Operations, rejecting all proposals for the institutionalization of the peacekeeping machinery
on a more democratic basis through the General Assembly.
In assessing possible future developments, Mr. Wainhouse suggests two main conclusions: (1) "Workable solutions for all the
problems of UN peacekeeping (veto-free authorization, ready
stand-by contingents, independent and reliable logistic support,
prearrangedfinancing, established command and control). . . are
not likely," and (2) "The present pragmatic, ad hoc UN peacekeeping system, with all its imperfections, best serves U.S. interests. "12 This somewhat pessimistic prognosis does not seem to coincide entirely with the official policy of Washington. President
Nixon, for example, stated unequivocally in his Fourth Report to
Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's (May 3,
1973) that "the strengthening of the United Nations peacekeeping
role is an important goal of American foreign policy." Dr. Henry
Kissinger, the Secretary of State, in his address before the UN
General Assembly, October 1973, deplored the impasse that had
been reached in "the fruitless debate . . . over the degree of
control [by the Security Council] over the peacekeeping machinery" and enjoined the assemblage to "delay no longer" and come
to some agreement "on peacekeeping guidelines so that this
organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future
crises. 1' 3 The series of resolutions numbering 338 to 341 adopted
by the Security Council in October 1973, for establishing a new
UNEF on the east bank of the Suez might possibly point to a new
direction for guiding international peacekeeping out of the quandary "at the crossroads."
Poeliu Dai*
11. Neidle, Peace-KeepingandDisarmament,57 Am.J. INT'L L. 46, 58 (1963).
12. WAINHOUSE, supra note 1, at 336-37.
13. 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 469, 471-72 (1973).
* Professor of Political Science, State University College of New York, at
Potsdam. A.B., 1929, University of Shanghai; Ph.D., 1934, Johns Hopkins University.
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